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Distributional Effects of CAP Subsidies: Micro Evidence from the EU
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Pavel Ciaian, d'Artis Kancs and Sergio Gomez y Paloma  
Abstract 
In this paper we estimate the income distributional effects of the common agricultural policy (CAP) for farmers 
and landowners. Using a unique farm level panel data set from the FADN for the period 1995-2007 we employ 
the fixed effects, the Heckman selection bias and the GMM estimators to estimate income distributional effects of 
CAP subsidies. The results do not confirm the theoretical hypothesis that landowners benefit a large share of the 
CAP subsidies. According to our estimates, farmers gain between 60% to 95%, 80% to 178% and 86% to 90% of 
the total value of coupled crop/animal, coupled RDP and decupled payments, respectively. The CAP subsidies are 
only marginally capitalised in land rents. Our results suggest that rental rates are more responsive to structural 
variables and show a strong time dependency, suggesting the presence of rigidities in the EU rental markets, 
which constraint the adjustment of land rents to market signals and thus reduce landowners' gains from the CAP. 
 
1.  Introduction 
The EU agricultural sector receives more than 50 billion Euros (ca. 45% of the EU budget) through the CAP 
subsidies per year. There is an ongoing debate among policy makers and scientific community about the actual 
beneficiaries of the CAP subsidies (or as referred to "income distributional effects of subsides"). Even though 
farmers are the primary recipients of the CAP subsidies, various factors may lead to a situation where farmers 
benefit only part of the subsidies or to a situation where farmers do not benefit from the CAP subsidies at all. 
Besides farmers, also other agricultural market participants may partly or fully capture the CAP subsidies. 
Particularly, this might be the case of landowners, consumers, and input suppliers. For example, studies from the 
US show that landowners capture a substantial share of subsidies (e.g. Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magné 2005; 
Kirwan 2005; Lence and Mishra 2003). 
  Theoretical studies show that depending on the type of subsidies and formal and informal institutions and 
market distortions, agricultural subsidies may or may not benefit farmers. The theoretical literature has explored 
how different types of agricultural policies (e.g. decoupled subsidies, export subsidies, price intervention) and 
other factors (e.g. elasticities, market imperfecttions, market structure) affect the distributional effects of subsidies 
(e.g. Alston and James 2002; de Gorter and Meilke 1989; Gardner 1983; Guyomard et al 2004; Salhofer 1996; 
Ciaian and Swinnen 2009).  
  The empirical evidence on distributional effects of farm subsidies is considerably scarcer. Two types of 
approaches have been followed in empirical literature. First, econometric studies try to estimate the distributional 
effects of subsidies. The vast majority of these studies estimate the capitalisation rate of subsidies into land values 
(i.e. landowners' policy rents) in North America (e.g. Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné 1992; Gardner 2002; Lence and 
Mishra 2003; Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins 2003; Kirwan 2005). There are only few studies on the capitalisation 
of the CAP in the EU (Duvivier, Gaspart and de Frahan 2005; Patton et al. 2008; Kilian et al. 2008).
2 The other 
strand of empirical literature applies partial equilibrium (PE) or general equilibrium (CGE) models to simulate the 
distributional effects of agricultural subsidies (e.g. Dewbre, Anton and Thompson 2001; Gohin and Moschini 
2006; Hubbard (1995); OECD 2000; Salhofer and Schmid 2004). Although PE and CGE models can capture 
complex interlinkages present in the agricultural markets, the simulated effects heavily depend on calibrated or 
arbitrary assumed elasticities. As a result, the confidence interval of these studies is rather big. 
  The objective of this study is to assess the distributional effects of the CAP subsidies in the EU. We consider 
coupled (crop and animal payments, RDP payments) and decoupled payments. These subsidies cover most of the 
CAP support (around 75% of the total CAP expenditures). Our main contribution to the literature is to empirically 
estimate how benefits of different types of the CAP subsidies are distributed between farmers and landowners. 
Employing a unique farm level Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) panel data for the period 1995-2007 
we are able to empirically estimate the distributional effects by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
  
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to Microeconomic Analysis Unit L.3 of the European Commission for granting access to the firm-level FADN 
data. The authors are solely responsible for the content of the paper. The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any 
circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission. 
2 With few exceptions (Dewbre and Mishra 2007; Henningsen, Kumbhakar and Lien 2009), the econometric estimates on farmers' benefits 
from subsidies are non-existent.   3
2.  Theoretical framework 
There is extensive theoretical literature on the distributional effects of agricultural subsidies. Most of these studies 
apply partial equilibrium models either by modelling a representative farm or by considering the supply-demand 
market interactions (e.g. Floyd 1965; Alston and James 2002; de Gorter and Meilke 1989; Gardner 1983; 
Guyomard, Mouël, and Gohin 2004; Salhofer 1996; Ciaian and Swinnen 2006, 2009). 
  In line with the first approach, in this paper we employ a stylised partial equilibrium model with perfect 
markets, whereby the representative farm's non-increasing to scale production technology,  ) , ( Z A f , where, f, the 
quantity of the final product, is assumed to be a function of two inputs (land, A, and non-land input, Z , (e.g. 
labour)) with  0 > i f ,  0 < ii f ,  0 > ij f ,
3 for i, j = A and Z. For simplicity, the entire land is assumed to be 
owned by landowners, which rent it to farms. The representative farm’s profits are given as follows: 
(1)  wZ rA Z A pf − − = ∏ ) , (  
where p is the price of the final product, r is rental price of land, and w is price of non-land input.  
  We analyse two types of CAP subsidies: (i) coupled direct payments and coupled RDP measures, and (ii) 
decoupled direct payments granted under the CAP. The coupled direct payments and the coupled RDP measures 
include crop area direct payments, animal direct payments, investment support, LFA payments, and 
environmental payments. The coupled direct payments are available to farmers in all EU Member States (MS), 
though they were significantly reduced with the introduction of the SPS in 2005. The decoupled CAP payments 
consist of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), and the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS). The SPS was 
introduced by the 2003 CAP reform and is implemented mainly in the Old MS starting from 2005. The SAPS is 
implemented in the New MS.  
 
Coupled CAP payments 
The coupled direct payments change farm profit function (1) as follows: 
(2)  Z s w A s r Z A f s p Z A Q ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( − − − − + = ∏  
  The crop coupled direct payments include payments such as compensatory area payments for cereals, oilseeds 
and protein crops, area payment to rice, etc. They are directly coupled to land and can be modelled as an area 
subsidy,  A s , linked to land (e.g. Dewbre et al. 2001; Kilian and Salhofer 2008). The coupled animal direct 
payments include various types of subsidies such as suckler cow premium, beef premium, slaughter premium, 
ewe premium, etc. These subsidies are either output (animal) type of payments,  Q s , (e.g. beef premium, slaughter 
premium) or subsidies linked to non-land input,  Z s , (e.g. suckler cow premium, ewe premium), which 
particularly affect the stock of breeding livestock.  
  Besides the crop and animal coupled direct payments, farmers receive also Rural Development Programme 
(RDP) payments (also known as the “second pillar” CAP policies). We study three types of RDP payments: the 
investment support, the LFA and environmental payments. Under the investment support programme farmers can 
obtain a grant to partly finance the costs of capital purchases. The investment support can be modelled as a non-
land (capital) input subsidy,  Z s , because it reduces the non-land input costs. The LFA is an area based payment to 
farmers located in less productive regions. Similar to the crop area payments, it can be modelled as an area 
subsidy,  A s . The environmental payments are granted for a range of farm activities aimed at improving 
environment on the farm. These payments cover additional costs and farm income foregone resulting from these 
activities. The environmental payments affect in particular farm input use, because they are conditional on the 
adoption of environmentally friendly production practices, such as input use reduction, organic farming, 
intensification of livestock, conversion of arable land to grassland, rotation measures, and support of biodiversity 
(European Commission 2005).  These payments can be modelled as land or/and non-land input subsidies,  A s ,  Z s , 
because they affect all inputs, but may not alter farm production level and/or farm income. For example, if the 
environmental payments cover exactly the additional costs, then their marginal impact on farm behaviour is zero. 
4 
  With decoupled subsidies farm and market equilibrium conditions are given as follows: 
(3)  A A Q s r f s p − = + ) (     and     Z Z Q s w f s p − = + ) (  
(4)  ) (p D f =  
(5)  ) (r S A
A =  
(6)  ) (w S Z
Z =  
                                                 
3  i f  and  ij f ,  ii f  are first and second derivatives of the production function with respect to its arguments, respectively. 
4 Implicitly it follows that the actual value of environmental payments could be positive, zero or negative depending on the size of 
additional costs induced by the payments.   4
where D is output demand and 
A S  and 
Z S  are supply functions of land and non-land inputs, respectively, with 
0 ≤ = ∂ ∂ p D p D ,  0 ≥
A
r S  and  0 ≥
Z
w S . 
  Equations (3) are farm marginal equilibrium conditions derived from maximisation of the profit function (2). 
They determine the farm input demands. Equations (4), (5) and (6) are market clearing conditions for output, land, 
and non-land input, respectively. 
  Farm's profit may be altered by subsidies ( i ds dΠ ) for two reasons: first, because farms are recipients of the 
subsidies; and second, because subsidies may affect agricultural output prices ( i ds dp ), and input prices (i.e. 
land,  i ds dr and non-land input  i ds dw ). Landowner’s income is affected if subsidies affect land rental prices 
( i ds dr ). Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions (3) – (6) and solving for  i ds dp , i ds dr , i ds dw , 
and  i ds dΠ  (for i = A, Z, Q), respectively, yields comparative static results, which are summarised in Table 1. 
The comparative static results reported in Table 1. According to these results, the ranking of income 
distributional effects between farmers and landowners depends on the type of the CAP payments. However, in 
well functioning markets, landowners are found to benefit a large share of all types of CAP subsidies through their 
capitalisation into land rents. This is due to inelastic land supply, which does not allow adjustments in land 
supply. The only channel of land market adjustment is rental price, when subsidies induce stronger competition 
for agricultural inputs. In particular, landowners are expected to gain proportionally more from CAP subsidies 
linked to land (e.g. crop area payments, LFA) than farmers (and other market agents), because land subsidies 
directly stimulate land market and because of inelastic land supply. Farmers and landowners are expected to share 
the benefit (losses) from output subsidies and non-land input subsidies (e.g. investment support, environmental 
payments). However, because of inelastic land supply, landowners may also benefit a substantial share of non-
land input and output subsidies.  
 
Decoupled CAP payments 
The CAP implements two types of decoupled direct payments: the SPS and the SAPS. The SPS was introduced by 
the 2003 CAP reform mainly in Old MS. The SAPS is implemented in most New MS in 2004.  
  Theoretically, the decoupled subsidies are expected to have a mixed impact on incomes of landowners and 
farmers (Kilian and Salhofer 2008; Courleux, et al. 2008; Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 2008). They may result in 
high capitalisation rates leading in such a way to considerable leakage of policy gains to landowners. This is the 
case of the SAPS and, if entitlements are surplus relative to the eligible area, also the case of the SPS. In this case 
both the SAPS and the SPS create similar market incentives as land based subsidies. However, as long as the 
number of eligible area exceeds the number of entitlements, the SPS benefit farmers. 
 
2.1.  Other factors affecting the income distributional effects of the CAP 
In the theoretical analysis above we assumed perfect input and output markets. However, in reality rural markets 
are affected by many other factors, the two most important of which are accompanying policy measures and land 
market institutions and regulations. 
  The income distributional effects of subsidies depend particularly on accompanying policy measures. In the 
real world agricultural support policies are combined in policy programmes involving multiple instruments 
implemented in the same time, none of which can be considered isolated from the others. For example, both 
coupled and decoupled CAP payments are conditional on the fulfilment of cross-compliance requirements. Farm 
failure to respect these conditions can lead to a reduction or a complete termination of the CAP payments. The 
conditionality of the CAP payments may mitigate their effects on land rents and farm profits due to the fact that 
the eligibly for subsidy may require farmers to incur certain costs.  
  The distributional effects of subsidies can be affected also by market institutions and regulations. The rental 
market regulations in the EU include e.g. rental price restrictions (minimum/maximum price) and regulations on 
the duration of rental contracts (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 2010). The rental price restrictions are in general 
formal imposed by government, whereas the duration of rental contracts can be regulated through both formal 
governmental interventions and/or through informal rural market institutions. Of particular importance for the 
CAP is the maximum price intervention. The potential capitalisation of the CAP into land rents will be reduced in 
the presence of a rental price ceiling and thus will facilitate higher transfers of the CAP rents toward farms. An 
important implication for the rental price adjustments has also the duration of rental contracts. Ceteris paribus, 
long-term rental contracts for agricultural land will adjust less to external changes than short-term contracts. 
According to Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2010), the key determinants of rental contract duration in the EU are 
social norms (e.g. in Greece), governmental regulations (e.g. there is a minimum of 9 years in Belgium and 
France, 6 years in the Netherlands and 5 in Spain), and market institutions (e.g. Germany, Italy, Sweden). 
Moreover, in several countries (e.g. France) even the renewal of rental contracts is regulated. The implications of   5
the rental contract duration on the CAP capitalisation are likely more significant than the rental price regulations, 
because they are more widespread in the EU (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 2010).  
 
3.  Econometric specification 
Solving the farm maximisation problem (equations (3)-(4)) and accounting for the SPS subsidies, farm income 
(profit) and land rents depend on the output price (p), the non-land input price (w), farm output (f) and decoupled 
and coupled subsidies (e and  i s  for i=Q, A, Z) suggesting the following econometric models:  
(7)  jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s jt X f w p e s r η α α α α α α α + + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  
(8)  jt jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s jt X f adj r w p e s ε δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ + + + + + + + + = Π 5 4 3 2 1 0 _  
where subscripts i, j, t stand for the type of coupled subsidies (i=Q, A,Z), farm and time, respectively; and  jt X  is a 
vector of observable covariates such as farm characteristics, regional, and time variables. As usual,  jt η  and  jt ε  
are the residuals.  
  The main interest in our study are parameters  s α  and  e α  in rental equation, and  s δ  and  e δ  in profit equation. 
These parameters indicate the income distributional effects of subsidies: i.e. the policy rents of landowners 
( s α , e α ) and farmers ( s δ , e δ ) per 1 Euro of coupled and decoupled CAP payments. 
  The estimation of equations (7) and (8) is subject to several econometric issues. We identify three key issues: 
omitted variable bias, selection bias and endogeneity. Without addressing these issues it is impossible to obtain 
consistent estimates of the incidence of agricultural subsidies on farmland rental rates. In order, to control for 
these econometric issues we estimate three econometric models: the fixed effects model, the Heckman selection 
bias model and the generalised method of moment (GMM) model. 
 
Omitted variable bias  
Equations (7) and (8) contain the key variables determining the incidence of agricultural subsidies. In addition to 
these included explanatory variables, there are also unobservable farm characteristics, e.g. farmer ability, which 
affect land rental price and net farm income, and in the same time are correlated with explanatory variables in 
equations (7) and (8). Ignoring the unobserved farm heterogeneity would cause omitted variable bias. 
  The panel structure of the FADN data allows us to control for the omitted variable bias. By employing 
properties of the panel data, the unobserved heterogeneity component that remains fixed over time can be 
controlled for thus eliminating or reducing considerably the omitted variable bias. In order to control for 
unobserved permanent farm-level characteristics, we follow Kirwan (2005) and estimate fixed effects model, 
which yields: 
(9)  jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s j jt X f w p e s b r η α α α α α α α + + + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  
(10)  jt jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s j jt X f adj r w p e s d ε δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ + + + + + + + + + = Π 5 4 3 2 1 0 _  
where  j b  and  j d  are fixed effects for farm  j , which capture time-unvarying farm-specific characteristics. These 
fixed effects reflect farm heterogeneity, such as different technologies for different farms, different managerial 
skills or other unobservable fixed farm specific characteristics. 
 
Selection bias 
A significant number of farms in the FADN dataset do not rent any land. Because of missing left hand side 
variables, these farms are excluded from our sample. To control for the selection bias related to farms' rental 
market participation decisions, we employ the Heckman's sample selection model (Heckman 1979). 
  One may expect that more dynamic farms and/or those with limited own land resources may be more inclined 
to participate on rental markets compared to less dynamic, part-time and/or subsistence farms. Farms with zero 
rentals will drop out from equation (7), as their land rental prices do not exist. If the farm rental decision is non-
random, then the standard estimation approach would result in biased estimates. To control for the potential 
sample selection bias, we follow Heckman (1979) and adopt a two stage estimation approach. In the first stage, 
we examine the determinants of farms' decision to rent agricultural land using a Probit model.
5 In the second 
stage, we estimate the rental equation (7) in first differences. The selection bias is controlled for through inclusion 
of the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) computed in the first stage.
6 This yields an empirically estimable Heckman's 
sample selection model, which controls for time-unvarying farm specific effects: 
                                                 
5 The dependent variable hj is a dichotomous (1, 0) variable indicating whether the j-th farm rented land or not. 
6 If IMR is significant in the second stage, it suggests there is significant bias in the initial model. However, one potential limitation of the 
Heckman method is that if the Heckman in the selection model is not well-specified, the IMR may be weaker than expected and the 
Heckman method may have limited power to detect bias. As a result, a second factor to examine following the addition of the IMR variable 
into the initial specification models is whether or not there have been significant changes in any of the parameter estimates.   6
(11)  jt jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s jt X f w p e s r η α α α α α α α ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ IMR 4 4 3 2 1  
  Although, the FADN sampling strategy is representative and methodologically consistent, theoretically, the 
estimation of equations (7) and (8) could also suffer from attrition bias. The FADN is an unbalanced panel, where 
every year 5 to 20 percent of farms are dropped from the sample. Farms are excluded either because of the FADN 
sampling strategy of regular annual replacement of observations and/or because of other reasons (voluntary drop-
out, exit from farming). If some groups of farms drop out from the sample more frequently than others, then the 
standard estimators would yield biased results. Therefore, we test also for the attrition bias. We find no significant 
impact on the estimated coefficients.
7   
 
Endogeneity 
If subsidies were assigned to farms randomly, then parameters  s α  and  e α  in the rental equation and parameters 
s δ  and  e δ  in the profit equation would measure the share of each extra subsidy Euro per hectare reflected in 
higher rental rates. In reality, however, subsidies are not assigned randomly to farms. For example, the coupled 
animal and crop subsidies depend on regional and farm level productivities. The coupled subsidies are allocated to 
each MS based on regional productivities (e.g. regional reference yield). At farm level the size of subsidies 
depends on the MS subsidy size (i.e. regional productivity) and on the farms' crop choice (e.g. supported versus 
non-supported crops). Similar holds for the SAPS in the new MS. Although, the SAPS is not based on farm 
productivities directly, it is nevertheless correlated with the pre-accession average country/regional productivities, 
because the base for the CAP application in new MS was the average production level and intensity in the pre-
accession period. This implies that the SAPS is exogenous at farm level within each new MS but endogenous 
between the new MS. The decoupled SPS payments depend on the past coupled payments and on the average 
country/regional productivities, because the value of the SPS was set based on regional productivities or/and farm 
past level of subsidies. The RDP (investment support, environmental payments) are allocated to farmers based on 
project submission. Only those farms which submit and have a successful project are granted the support. Hence 
the RDP is non-random because farms self-select to participate and only those with the best projects (likely the 
more productive farms) are granted the RDP support.  This structure of coupled and decoupled CAP subsidies 
implies that they are endogenous variables reflecting the characteristics of country/regions’ land and farmer’s 
behaviour. 
  These endogeneity problems may lead to biased estimates. To address this source of endogeneity, we employ 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) robust two-step GMM estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that lagged 
endogenous variables are valid instrument in panel data setting. This allows us to use lagged levels of the 
endogenous variables as instruments (additionally to exogenous variables), after the equation has been first-
differenced to eliminate the farm specific effects. The GMM estimator is particularly suitable for datasets with a 
large number of cross-sections and few periods and it requires that there is no autocorrelation. The FADN dataset 
matches these requirements, because it is a panel data and contains a very large number of farm-level observations 
relative to the period covered. Given that the robust two-step GMM standard errors can be severely downward 
biased, we use the Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust variances. 
 
4.  Data and variable construction 
The main source of the data used in the empirical analysis is the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), 
which is compiled and maintained by the European Commission. The FADN is a European system of sample 
surveys that take place each year and collect structural and accountancy data on the farms. To our knowledge, the 
FADN is the only source of micro-economic data that is harmonised (the bookkeeping principles are the same 
across all EU Member States) and is representative of the commercial agricultural holdings in the whole EU.  
  The FADN data is a panel dataset, which means that farms that stay in the sample over consecutive years can 
be traced over time using a unique identifier. In this study we use panel data for 1995-2007 covering all EU MS 
except Romania and Bulgaria. Romania and Bulgaria were excluded from the sample, because for these countries 
the data were available only for one year (2007). 
  The dependent variable in equation (7) ( jt r ) - land rental price - is constructed from the FADN data by 
dividing the total amount of rent paid for farm land and rental charges with the total utilised agricultural area 
(UAA) rented by the holder under a tenancy agreement for a period of at least one year. The dependent profit 
variable in equation (8) ( jt Π ) – net farm income – is calculated by subtracting taxes, variable expenses 
(intermediate, land, labour) and fixed costs (depreciation and interest payments) from the total farm revenues 
(output and subsidies). We estimate equation (8) per hectare, which means that we divide the obtained net farm 
income with the utilised agricultural area. 
                                                 
7 The results are available upon request from the authors.   7
  Similarly, all subsidy variables (coupled crop area payments, coupled animal payments, decoupled payments 
(SPS and SAPS), investment support, environmental payments and LFA) (e and  i s  for i=Q, A, Z) are constructed 
from the FADN data and are calculated on per-hectare basis. Every agricultural producer in the FADN survey is 
asked to report both the total subsidies received as well as to specify the amount by major subsidy types. To 
account for taxes and other types of subsidies, we construct variable other subsidies by subtracting taxes from rest 
of the farm payments not included in the above payment categories.  
  Also the output and input control variables in equations (7) and (8) ( jt w ,  jt adj r _ ,  jt f ) are constructed from 
the FADN data. To account for the output and input price adjustments we include market return, wage, other 
inputs and adjusted rental price (only for income equation (8)). The market return variable is constructed by 
dividing the total farm output by the total utilised agricultural area. The wage variable is constructed as a weighted 
average of the regional mean wage and farm specific wage. The variable other inputs includes crop/animal-
specific inputs (seeds and seedlings, fertilisers, crop protection products, feed, other specific costs), overheads, 
depreciation and interest costs. It is constructed as a weighted average of the sectoral/regional mean and farm 
specific value and it is divided by the UAA. Similarly, the adjusted rental price is a weighted average of the 
regional/sectoral rate and farm specific rent. We utilise weighted input costs (i.e. wage, other inputs and rents) of 
the regional/sectoral mean and farm-specific values in order to control for three factors: regional opportunity 
values of inputs, measurement error potentially present at farm level data
8 as well as farm specific effects (e.g. 
labour skill differences, land quality at farm, farm specific technology).  
 The  covariates  matrix, jt X , includes other explanatory variables, which affect land rents and farm income. 
We consider the following covariates: land rented ratio, labour own ratio, sharecropped land, farm size, land per 
capita, irrigated land, area under glass, fallow land, credit and capital availability and sectoral, regional and time 
dummies.  
  Variables used in the GMM regressions are structured in endogenous and exogenous and are summarised in 
Table 2.
9 To reduce the endogeneity problem between various types of subsidies and to reduce the number of 
instruments, we merge the subsidy types into four main groups: RDP  (investment support,  environmental 
payments, LFA), coupled payments (crop area payments, animal payments) decoupled payments (SPS, SAPS), 
other subsidies (the rest of subsidies minus taxes). To account for the dynamic adjustment of rents and farm 
income, we create lagged dependent (2 lags) and lagged explanatory (0 and 1) variables. For all endogenous 
variables, we use the first lag as an instrument alongside the exogenous variables and lagged dependent variables. 
The choice of lags for instruments was selected by checking the validity of different sets of instruments. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
We estimate the incidence of agricultural subsidies on farmland rental rates in three alternative models: the fixed 
effects model, the Heckman sample selection model and the first difference GMM model. Table 3 reports the 
fixed effects panel data estimates in levels, where the dependent variables are net farm income (columns 1-3) and 
land rental price (columns 4-6). Additional to the complete income and rental equation specification in columns 1 
and 4, we add lag dependent variable in specifications 3 and 4 and, following Dewbre and Mishra (2007), we 
exclude variables potentially causing multicollinearity in specification 2 and 5. 
  Generally, the farm income models yield significantly ‘better’ estimates than the rental price models. For 
example, most of the estimated coefficients have the expected sign in the income equation, and market returns 
have a positive and significant impact on farm income whereas inputs costs reduce farm income (columns 1-3). 
This is not the case for the rental equation, where input variables are either statistically insignificant or they have a 
positive sign although, according to our expectations, market returns increase land rents (columns 4-6).     
  Both the income and land rent coefficients weakly increase with farm size, which may reflect the presence of 
economies of scale. The land abundance variable (land per capita) is positive and significant for income equation 
but not for the rental equation. The rented land ratio reduces both income and land rents. Profits are affected 
because of lower incentive associated with the use of rented land and because of higher costs of farms relying on 
rented land as opposed to farms owning land. Rental rates might decrease because of lower incentive associated 
with the use of rented land. Sharecropped land ratio has a positive sign but is not statistically significant in most 
of the estimated models. Own labour (labour own ratio) increases farm profits because of cost reducing effect. 
Contrary to our expectations, own labour reduces land rents as, due to incentive differences between family and 
hired labour, one would expect the opposite sign (e.g. Pollak 1985; Allen and Lueck 1998). The coefficient 
associated with the output livestock ratio is statistically insignificant. Higher farm own consumption reduces farm 
income and land rents, which possibly is because of smaller market orientation of farms producing for self-
                                                 
8 For example, regional averages were utilised for farms with missing wage, rental price and other costs data (because of zero labour hiring 
and zero land renting). 
9 The agricultural employment is relatively low in the overall EU employment (around 2-5%) implying that farms are likely price taker on 
the labour market and hence the wage rate is most likely exogenous for individual farms.   8
consumption. The liabilities-to-assets ratio increase income and land rants, which may indicate the presence of 
farm credit constraint. 
  All estimated models suggest that subsidies significantly influence farm income (columns 1-3, Table 3). The 
estimates are relatively stable across the models except for the coupled crop and animal payments, which suggest 
their correlation with the excluded variables in specification 2, such as market returns and input prices (column 2 
in Table 3). As discussed in the previous section, the regional and farm level productivities represent a strong 
determinant of coupled CAP subsidies. Our estimates imply that the net farm income increases between 0.77 EUR 
and 1.65 EUR for each subsidy EUR
10. Surprisingly, the estimated subsidy coefficients are particularly high for 
LFA and coupled crop area payments for farm income. According to the theoretical predictions, both should be 
capitalised into land rents and benefit landowners instead of farmers. As expected the decoupled payment 
estimates (between 0.89 and 0.92) are slightly higher than the estimates for coupled crop/animal payments and the 
investment support (between 0.60 and 0.90). In contrast, the environmental payments generate slightly higher 
farm income effect (between 0.85 and 1.00) compared to decoupled payments, which is contrary to the theoretical 
expectations. These results may suggest that they do not induce farm behavioural effects, e.g. additional costs.  
  Although, the estimates of the income distributional effects of subsidies reported in Table 3 are rather high, 
they are consistent with other studies. For example, Henningsen, Kumbhakar and Lien (2009) report that the 
intermediate input subsidies have a negative impact on farmers' income in Norway (i.e. -0.39), while output 
subsidies and decoupled payments fully benefit farmers (1.02 and 1.00, respectively). The estimates of Dewbre 
and Mishra (2007) for US range between 0.96 and 0.97 for decoupled payments and between 0.50 and 0.83 for 
coupled payments. 
  Regarding the land rental price equation, the estimates of subsidy effects are statistically significant for 
roughly half of the variables, but their values are relatively low (less than 0.05), implying that subsidies are not an 
important determinant of land rents (columns 4-6, Table 3). These findings contradict the empirical studies from 
the US, which find that the capitalisation rate for coupled and decoupled subsidies is between 20-100%.
11 Among 
the possible explanations behind the relatively low estimates could be strict rental market regulations in the EU, 
and identification issues. In addition, the rental costs in the FADN data include not only farm land rents, but also 
rents for buildings and other rental charges. Although, we made an attempt to correct for this data issue,
12 the data 
may still contain a measurement error bias.  
  Table 4 reports the Heckman first-difference estimates for rental equation, which controls for the rental 
market participation bias. The coefficient of the Inverse Mills Ratio, which tests the impact of rental market 
participation bias, fails to be significant and parameter estimates of subsidies are to a large extent consistent with 
the fixed effects estimates reported in Table 3, which confirms that the CAP subsidies are capitalised into land 
rents at a low rate.   
  The GMM estimates are shown in Table 5.
13 As usual, we start with diagnostic tests. We employ the 
Arellano-Bond statistics to test for serial dependence of errors. The tests indicate strong evidence against the null 
hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors at order 1 but confirm no autocorrelation in the 
first-differenced errors at order 2 in both the rental and income equations. Serial correlation of order higher than 1 
would imply misspecification of the model. The test for the validity of instruments performs better for the income 
equation than for the rental equation. The Sargan test statistics indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the over-identifying restrictions are valid for the income equation. However, for the rental price equation, the 
test rejects the null hypothesis, implying that instruments may be correlated with the residuals and thus fail to 
fulfil the exogeneity condition. The Sargan test rejection may be also a result of heteroskedasticity. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) found tendency for this test to be under-rejected in the presence of heteroskedasticity. To account for 
heteroskedasticity, we follow Windmeijer (2005) and use robust standard errors. 
  Generally, the GMM results reported in Table 5 are fairly consistent with the fixed effects results reported in 
Table 3 for the income equation (columns 1 and 2). The consistency is particularly strong in terms of sign for all 
parameters and of magnitude for parameters corresponding to subsidies, market return and input prices. The rental 
equation shows significant changes in the sign, magnitude and significance level for all parameters compared to 
the fixed effects results (columns 3 and 4). These results confirm that the rental equation does not respond well to 
variables predicted by the theory. The majority of the estimated coefficients corresponding to subsidies, market 
return and input prices are not significant. A strong determinant of rents appears to be lagged values of rents, 
indicating the rigidity of rental markets potentially induced by rental price regulations and long durations of rental 
                                                 
10 The subsidy farm income effect higher than 1.00 may be caused by the interaction of subsidies with the farm credit constraint leading to 
productivity upgrade and hence higher farm income (Ciaian and Swinnen 2009). 
11 The empirical findings from the studies show that land capitalisation of both coupled and decoupled subsidies (based on US studies) 
varies between 20% and (more than) 90% (Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magné 2003, 2005; Lence and Mishra 2003; Roberts, Kirwan, and 
Hopkins 2003; Kirwan 2005; Barnard, et al. 1997; Taylor and Brester 2005). 
12 For example by excluding high value rents which may represents rental for buildings. 
13 The variables employed in GMM are summarised in Table 3.   9
contracts. In the presence of rental price thresholds and long durations of rental contracts, land rents do not adjust 
to market signals but tend to stay unchanged over time, which may lead to a lagged dependency between rents. 
Additionally, rents are responsive to control variables such as farm size, land rented ratio, output livestock ratio, 
indicating that the farm structural differences are strong determinants of rental rates.  
  According to the results reported in Table 5, a substantial share of the CAP payments benefit farms (columns 
1 and 2). Relative to the fixed effects results (Table 3), the RDP and coupled payments tend to generate higher 
gains to farmers whereas decoupled payments induce slightly lower benefits if lagged effects are not taken into 
account (model 1). Accounting for the lagged dependencies (model 2), the contemporaneous farm income effect 
of subsidies is reduced, and the lagged coefficients of subsidies are not statistically significant. The estimates in 
Table 5 indicate that farmers benefit between 0.81 to 0.95 EUR, 0.81 to 0.86 EUR and more than 1.00 EUR for 
each payment EUR of coupled, decupled and RDP payments, respectively (columns 1 and 2). For the rental 
equation most of the coefficients measuring the subsidy capitalisation into land rents are statistically not 
significant (Table 5, columns 3 and 4). 
  
Identification issues and limitations 
The estimated results reported in Table 3 to Table 5 show that capitalization of the CAP subsidies into land rents 
is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions saying that a substantial share of all types of CAP subsidies benefit 
landowners (see the theoretical section 2). Two issues may yield these results: governmental regulations and 
rental market institutions, and identification problem. 
  The extensive governmental regulations and rental market institutions (minimum/maximum price; long-term 
rental contracts) in the EU may prevent land rents to adjust to policy changes. A study of Ciaian, Kancs and 
Swinnen (2010) reports the presence of important rental market regulations including rental price restrictions 
(minimum/maximum price) and the regulations on the duration of rental contracts. The rental price restrictions are 
in general imposed by government whereas the duration of rental contracts can be implemented by both formal 
governmental interventions and/or through informal rural market institutions. According to Ciaian, Kancs and 
Swinnen (2010),
14 several MS implement minimum or maximum rental prices such as Belgium, France, Greece 
and the Netherlands. These price interventions (particularly the maximum price) may reduce the transmission of 
subsidies into land rents. An even more important implication on the rental price adjustments has the long-term 
duration of rental contracts because, according to Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2010), they tend to be more 
widespread than rental price regulations. For example, several countries have the average duration of rental 
contracts longer than 5 years (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Spain). In Italy the average 
duration is 2 to 5 years for arable crops and 5 to 10 years for fruit crops (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 2010). The 
long-term duration of rental contracts makes rental markets stickier and the time lag for the adjustment to policy 
changes takes a longer time period.  
  An important shortcoming of the FADN rental data is that it does not contain any information about the farm 
rental contracts and rental market regulations (e.g. contract type, contract duration, maximum rental price), which 
would allow to control for the rental market institutions. For example, to control for the rental contract duration, 
Patton et al. (2008) exclude from their sample in Northern Ireland all farms with the duration of contracts longer 
than one year and find (contrary to our empirical finding) high coupled subsidy capitalisation into land rents 
(between 0.40 and 1.20). Similarly, Kilian et al (2008) consider a variable measuring the share of newly signed 
rental contracts in order to estimate the difference in land capitalisation rate between the SPS and the pervious 
coupled subsidies in Bavaria (Germany). Their estimates indicate that the SPS is capitalised by additional 15% to 
19% above the previous coupled subsidies. However, since Kilian et al (2008) use a cross-section data, they are 
not able to control for unobserved farm specific effects.  
  Particularly the rental price estimates may suffer from identification problems. If the law of one (rental) price 
holds, then the cross-sectional variation in rental price in each region/MS is independent of the subsidy variation 
at farm level, whereas the time variation in rental price, which may be induced by change in the subsidies, will be 
captured by regional/time dummies, or other region/country specific variables. This is because the equilibrium 
market rental price adjustments are determined by overall marginal and not by the farm specific marginal change 
of subsidies. In other words, the law of one price implies that the variation in land rents is not farm-specific but 
the rental prices tend to respond to policy or market changes at the same rate for all farms in a given region/MS. 
For farm income estimates this is less of a problem, because profits are farm specific and are determined by both 
farm and region specific variables (including subsidies).  
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we estimate the distributional effects of the CAP subsidies between farmers and landowners. We use 
the FADN farm level panel data for the period 1995-2007. We employ the fixed effects, the Heckman sample 
selection model and the GMM estimators to estimate the distributional effects of CAP subsidies. The empirical 
                                                 
14 The study of Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2010) cover 11 MS.   10
results do not confirm the theoretical predictions, whereby landowners benefit a large proportion of the CAP 
subsidies. In contrast, our estimates suggest that farmers benefit the major share of all types of CAP subsidies 
(RDP, coupled and decupled payments). According to our results, farmers gain more than 60% of CAP payments, 
i.e. they gain 60% to 95%, 86% to 90% and 80% to 178% of coupled, decupled and RDP payments, respectively. 
Our estimates are relatively robust with respect to different specifications and estimation approaches. 
  In contrast, landowners are found to benefit only marginally from subsidies; the coefficient estimates are 
either statistically not significant or their magnitudes are close to zero. These estimates could change, if, for 
example, improved rental contract data becomes available (e.g. duration of rental contract; presence of new 
contracts). Further, our results suggest that farmland rental rates are more responsive to structural variables (farm 
size, farm specialisation, importance of renting) than to variables predicted by the theory (market returns, input 
prices, subsidies). Additionally, the empirical results confirm a strong time dependency between the land rents 
(i.e. current rental rates depend on the lagged rents), suggesting that the presence of rigidities on the EU rental 
markets (rental price regulations and prevalence of long duration of rental contracts) may considerably constrain 
the rental price adjustments and thus reduce the landowners gains from subsidies relative to farmers. At the same 
time, the dependency of rental price on structural variables may indicate the identification problem of the farm 
level variation of subsidies on land rents. This is because, if the law of one (rental) price holds, the cross-sectional 
and the time variation in rental price in each region/MS is independent of the subsidy variation at farm level but it 
is likely correlated and captured by the time and/or region/country specific dummy variables. 
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Table 1. Transfer efficiency of coupled subsidies  
  Output subsidy ( Q s )  Land subsidy ( A s )  Non-land input subsidy ( Z s ) 












































































































































































































































































































































;  Q s s p p + = . For non-increasing return to scale 
production function it follows that  AZ AZ AA ZZ f f f f ≥  implying  0 > A U . 
 
 
Table 2. Variables used in the GMM estimation  
 Variable  name  Lags 
Dependent variable     
  Land rental price  2 
 Net  farm  income  2 
Endogenous variables     
  RDP  0 and 1 
  Coupled payments  0 and 1 
  Decoupled payments  0 and 1 
  Other subsidies  0 and 1 
  Market return  0 and 1 
  Adjusted rental price  0 and 1 
  Other inputs  0 and 1 
  Building-machinery per ha  1 
  Farm product stock  0 and 1 
 Investment  1 
   Exogenous variables 
Wage, Farm size,  
Land per capita, Land rented ratio, Sharecropped land 
ratio, Labour own ratio, Output livestock ratio, Own-
consumption ratio, Liabilities-to-assets ratio, and other 
dummies for sector, country, and their interaction 
terms. 
0 
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Table 3. Fixed effects estimates of net farm income and land rental price for EU 
  Net farm income    Land rental price 
 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Investment support  0.866***  0.805*** 0.861***   0.00998**  0.0113*** 0.0149*** 
Environmental payments  0.969*** 1.006***  0.947***   0.00713 0.0110** 0.00655 
LFA  1.213***  1.264*** 1.197***   0.0421***  0.0497*** 0.0412*** 
Coupled crop area payments  0.912***  0.593***  0.904***    0.00252  -0.00152  0.00163 
Coupled animal payments  0.832*** 0.773***  0.815***    0.00787**  0.00864***  -0.000149 
Decoupled payments  0.920***  0.889*** 0.908***    -0.0181*** -0.0175***  -0.0161*** 
Other subsidies  1.639***  1.005***  1.567***   -0.00161  -0.00605  -0.00517 
Market return  0.881***    0.879***    0.0075***    0.00741*** 
Wage  -0.00929***   -0.00923***   0.0005***  0.00029*** 
Adjusted rental price  -0.0822***    -0.0811***         
Other inputs  -1.046***    -1.031***    -0.000371    0.000622 
Net farm income(-1)      -0.0133***         
Land rental price(-1)              0.153*** 
              
Observations 675719  677501  498882    434261  435393  319714 
R-squared 0.834  0.032  0.840   0.046  0.039  0.074 
Number of idn  177151  177262  131325    114103  114177  84030 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Note: for the sake of conciseness not all variables are reported  
 
Table 4. Heckman first difference estimates of land rental price for EU 
  Land rental price 
Investment support  0.00879*** 
Environmental payments  0.00715** 
LFA 0.0299*** 
Coupled crop area payments  0.00785*** 
Coupled animal payments  0.00990*** 
Decoupled payments  -0.00763*** 
Other subsidies  -0.000645 
Market return  0.00602*** 
Wage 0.000350*** 
Adjusted rental price   
Other inputs  0.00172*** 
  
Observations 557048 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Note: For the sake of conciseness not all variables are reported  
 
Table 5. Arellano and Bond estimates of farm income and land rental price for EU 
 Net  farm  income    Land rental price 
 (1)    (2)    (3)  (4) 
RDP 1.782***    1.328***    -0.101**  -0.0577 
RDP(-1)     -0.264    -  0.0145 
Coupled payments  0.950***    0.815***    -0.0176  -0.0212 
Coupled payments(-1)      0.158    -  0.0129 
Decoupled payments  0.864***    0.812***    -0.0131  -0.0188 
Decoupled payments(-1)      0.123    -  0.0134 
Other subsidies  1.275**    0.953    -0.00184  0.125 
Other subsidies(-1)      0.755    -  0.0302 
Market return  0.972***    0.914***    -0.00303  0.00322 
Market return(-1)  -    0.101      -0.00237 
Wage -0.00310***    -0.00251*    -0.000362*  -0.000264 
Wage(-1) -    -0.00262*    -  0.000434** 
Adjusted rental price  -0.0517    0.174    -  - 
Adjusted rental price(-1)  -    -0.442    -  - 
Observations 116920    116431    76584  76362 
Number of idn  47345    47291    30347  30321 
            
Sargan test (Prob > chi2)  0.1312    0.1880    0.0000  0.0000 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test           
    AR(1) (Prob > z)  0.0000    0.0001    0.0000  0.0000 
    AR(2) (Prob > z)  0.5214    0.4949    0.1108  0.1133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Estimates are based on the period 2000-2007; For the sake of conciseness not all variables are reported  